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CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION-WATER RIGHTS
Expanding growth pressures and scarce water combine to foretell
an upcoming water crisis for the State of New Mexico. This situation only appears worse when it is realized that our national consumption of water is expanding faster than population.'
The drafting of a new constitution for New Mexico comes at a
time when the role played by water in the state's growth is of critical
importance. Decisions as to how this resource will be employed in
future years will be made pursuant to statutory law, judicial decisions
and constitutional provisions. Delegates to the convention will be
faced with the question of what the constitution should contain with
regard to water resources law in New Mexico.
In answering this question delegates will be considering two documents: the present constitution and the proposed constitutional revision.2 Similarly, these two documents will be used as a framework
around which the following discussion will be built.3
Before relevant provisions of the constitution are examined, however, a brief description of the basic water law system in New Mexico is in order. For purposes of orientation, it should be pointed out
that two water law systems exist in the United States, the riparian
and the prior appropriation. Riparian law states that a water right
is incident to ownership of land which is physically adjacent to a
public water source. All rights along a stream have an equal claim
and the number of holders of such rights is subject to increase or decrease as ownership of the land changes hands. 4 Prior appropriation
is the system adopted in most western states, including New Mexico,
and is quite different from riparian law. Under a prior appropriation
scheme a water right is not incident to land ownership adjacent to a
stream and may be conveyed separately from title to the land. Each
right along a stream is given a priority, and in theory, when a shortage occurs the last drop is taken from the lowest priority before any
water is denied the next to last priority. With these basic tenets of
the prior appropriation system in mind we can proceed to examine
both the existing and proposed constitutional water law provisions.
1. N. Wollman, The Value of Water in Alternative Uses xi (1962).
2. Report of New Mexico Constitutional Revision Commission (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Commission Report].
3. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to present a complete review of New
Mexico water law. The existing and proposed constitutions will be contrasted and the
significance of changes in the latter, along with issues raised, will be briefly analyzed.
4. Ellis, Water Rights: What They Are and How They Are Created, 13 Rocky Mt.
Mineral L. Rev. 451, 453 (1967). This article provides a concise description of the
two American water law systems with emphasis on the prior appropriation system which
New Mexico purports to follow.

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 9

Presently, water law provisions consist of four sections which are
found in article XVI of the constitution. The proposed provisions
consist of three sections and make up article XII of the suggested
constitution.
Section one of the existing constitution states that "[a]ll existing
rights to the use of any waters in this state for any useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and confirmed." 5 The Constitutional Revision Commission's proposed section one leaves this provision basically unchanged." All that is suggested is the deletion of
the words "hereby recognized and" which add very little to the
meaning of section one. In the interest of brevity this seems a desirable deletion. The proposed section will still clearly protect existing water rights in the state.
In contrast to the minor change in section one, proposed section
two offers several changes, at least two of which are significant.
Existing section two provides:
The unappropriated water of every natural stream, perennial or torrential, within the State of New Mexico, is hereby declared to belong
to the public and to be subject to appropriation for beneficial use, in
accordance with the laws of the state. Priority of appropriation shall
give the better right.

Proposed section two provides:
All natural waters, surface or subsurface, within the state belong to
the public and are subject to appropriation for beneficial use, except
as otherwise may be provided by the legislature pursuant to section
three of this article. Priority of appropriation shall give the better
right, except as otherwise provided by law. (emphasis supplied)

The first change in section two is found in the initial wording
where the proposed section states that all natural waters belong to
the public. This contrasts with the existing wording which subjects
"the unappropriated water of every natural stream. . . ." to public
ownership. A review of New Mexico water law reveals that there
would be no change in substance here since the existing constitution
has been taken in practice to mean that all water is owned by the
public and is controlled by the state. The existing section two does
not mean that water already appropriated is privately owned in the
common usage of that term. Another, and more accurate way to view
a water right is to think of it as a usufructory right or a usufruct
which is defined as:
5. N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 1.
6. Commission Report 182.
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The right of enjoying a thing, the property of which is vested in another, and to draw from the same all the profit, utility, and advantage
which it may produce, provided it be without altering the substance of
the thing.7

In State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co.8 the
New Mexico supreme court, in construing the present section two,
said ".

.

. that this constitutional provision is only 'declaratory of

prior existing law', always the rule and practice under Spanish and
Mexican dominion." 9 The court further said that the practice, begun
under Mexican sovereignty and continued after American acquisition, was that under the doctrine of prior appropration all waters
subject to appropriation are public.
In reality then, water rights are rights to the use of public waters
and are subject to control by the state. This was made explicit by the
New Mexico supreme court even before Red Jiver Valley Co. was
decided. In Harkey v. Smith'0 it was said that the New Mexico
Constitution ".

.

. merely declares the basis of the right to the use

of water, and in no manner prohibits the regulation of the enjoyment
of that right."" The proposed wording therefore merely updates
the constitution by accurately describing what the law in fact is with
regard to the status of water rights.
The second change in section two is the specific inclusion of all
natural subsurface waters in the category of water resources belonging to the public. No direct reference to the status of subsurface
water is found in existing section two. A review of New Mexico
water law reveals that there would be no change in substance here,
for in practice, all natural subsurface waters are treated as belonging
to the public. As was the case with surface waters in the previous discussion, subsurface water rights are subject to state control.
The inclusion in proposed section two of the word "subsurface"
would constitutionally confirm what is already statutory law in the
form of New Mexico Statutes section 75-11-19. This section, entitled "Underground waters declared to be public" provides :12
For the purposes of this act (75-11-19 to 75-11-22) all underground
waters of the state of New Mexico are hereby declared to be public
7. Black's Law Dictionary 1712 (4th ed. 1957).
8. 51 N.M. 207, 182P.2d421 (1947).

9. Id. at 217, 182 P.2d at 427. This case was not the first to so hold as the long list
of cases cited indicates. Red River Valley Co. is the most recent case, however, to put
to rest the argument that appropriated waters are a matter of private right.
10. 31N.M. 521,247P. 550 (1926).
11. Id. at 527, 247 P. at 552.
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-19 (Repl. 1968). Almost identical wording appears in
§ 75-11-1 which is the initial section in article 11, Underground Waters.
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waters and to belong to the public of the state of New Mexico and to
be subject to appropriation for beneficial use within the state of New
Mexico. All existing rights to the beneficial use of such waters are
hereby recognized.

Similar provisions in earlier statutes 13 declaring underground
water to be public have been held constitutional in Yeo v. Tweedy 4
and State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority.15 Although public ownership of all
underground water is the law under the existing constitution, consistency would seem to require that specific mention of it be made
in a future constitution.

It has been said that in its purest form the prior appropriation
system is comprised of three elements or requirements: a natural
stream, an appropriation and its application to a beneficial use. 6
The third change in section two deals with the beneficial use requirement necessary to establish a water right. Under the proposed constitution, the legislature could set aside certain waters for scenic and
recreational uses. This proposed wording in section two specifically
refers to section three; consequently further discussion on this provision will be held until later.
The most far-reaching provision of the proposed constitution is
found in the last six words of the final sentence of section two which
reads: "[p]riority of appropriation shall give the better right, except as otherwise provided by law." Controversy over this suggested
addition is likely because a number of different interpretations of it
can be made and opinions will differ over the extent to which the
provision will be applied.
It is stated in the comment to proposed section two that the addition of the last six words "will not change existing law in any way."' 17
The inclusion of the words themselves will not change the law but
they do leave the way clear for possible significant changes in the
future. It might be argued by opponents of the change that the addition destroys the prior appropriation system for New Mexico-a
system which has been constitutionally recognized since statehood.
This argument is not totally without merit. Taking the last six words
of proposed section two in their usual and ordinary sense, strict enforcement of priorities could be avoided when water resources are
allocated at some time in the future. Presumably this power to avoid
strict enforcement would reside in the legislature, but whether this
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See N.M. Laws 1927, ch. 182; N.M. Laws 1931, ch. 131.
34 N.M. 611,286 P. 970 (1930).
55 N.M. 12,225 P.2d 1007 (1950).
See J. Sax, Water Law, Planning and Policy 218 (1968).
Commission Report 185.
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would be an exclusive power is not clear. If the convention adopts
this exception and intends that the courts and the state engineer not
have the authority, it might be wise to so specify.
In discussing proposed section two the Commission states that its
purpose is to give "the legislature greater elasticity to adapt to
changing circumstances."' 8 As the Commission further asserts, water
rights are not currently being enforced in the state because most
streams have not been adjudicated and without an adjudication enforcement is all but impossible. 9 In practice, therefore, it might be
argued that New Mexico is not really a functioning prior appropriation state. On the other hand, it might be said that New Mexico is
still a prior appropriation state and that priorities are not being enforced along some adjudicated streams because such enforcement has
2
not yet been neccessary.
The exact status of water rights in New Mexico varies from
stream to stream. Along some water courses upstream users take
what water they need, and downstream users do without, regardless
of whether they might have senior rights if the stream were adjudicated.2 ' Along other streams, some of which have been adjudicated (e.g., the Pecos River), surface rights are being supplemented
by ground water pumping so that critical shortages, and hence strict
enforcement, have been avoided. 2 ' Along a few streams, users have
established proration agreements as to the allocation of water.2
These agreements are referred to by the Commission as "long standing agreements" and the "status quo." The decision that the state
must face therefore is whether to adjudicate all streams and strictly
enforce priorities, thereby voiding "long standing" proration agree18. Id.
19. An adjudication is a device that is used to enable a water commissioner (in New
Mexico the State Engineer) to administer appropriated rights. Sax, in Water Law,
Planning and Policy, states at page 231: "[i]n essence, it [an adjudication proceeding]
is a statutory class action in which all the users on a given stream are brought into a
judicial proceeding, in which each putative appropriator proves his claim, and thereupon receives a decree describing his water right."
20. Basically, this is the situation as the state engineer views it. According to the
chief legal counsel in the state engineer's office, essentially all streams in New Mexico
are fully appropriated and no new permits for surface rights are being issued. So far,
shortages along adjudicated streams have not been so critical as to require the strict enforcement of rights.
21. An example of this situation is offered by the status quo along some tributaries
of the Rio Grande in northern New Mexico. In some of these cases, what would be
very senior rights of Indian pueblos suffer at the hands of upstream users.
22. This ground water supplementation of a surface right is made possible by the
New Mexico case of Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 65 N.M.
59, 332 P.2d 465 (1958). There it was held that a water right holder could follow his
appropriated water to its original source and there sink a well to draw water which
once flowed in the stream bed.
23. This practice is used along some streams in the southern part of the state.
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ments, or whether to adjudicate streams in such a way that these
proration agreements are not upset. As the Commission points out,
under the present constitution the first alternative is the only course
available. Under a more flexible provision, such as proposed section
two, the legislature has the option either to remain silent and let
prior appropriation prevail or to act and allow proration agreements
to stand along streams where they now exist. Proposed section two,
by granting the legislature this broad power, has the attractive feature of giving the voting public a more immediate voice in the decision-making process.
Opponents of the additional wording in proposed section two
may well argue that the change will tend to hinder the marketability
of water rights in the state. This argument, for example, alleges
that investors who might be eager to buy up senior rights and locate
industry in the state will be reluctant to commit their capital if the
constitution contains even a hint of any policy other than strict enforcement of water rights within the state. Not only would new investors be dissuaded, but all water rights in the state would be
clouded by the lack of definition, thereby adversely affecting market24
ability.
Another opposition argument, and a persuasive one, is that such a
far-reaching constitutional change as proposed section two would
put in doubt the holdings in a whole series of water law cases decided
by New Mexico courts. It might be argued that this disruptive effect
could be avoided by deleting the last six words of proposed section
two.

If proposed section two was adopted and subsequently water
rights were not strictly enforced, the issue of eminent domain could
be raised as a result of claims by senior right holders. This argument
states that if a user is not getting all his appropriated water because
of state law passed pursuant to proposed section two, his property
is being taken without due process of law in violation of the United
States and New Mexico constitutions.2 5 Governmental authority to
take private property under its police power is broad but not unlimited. This broad power was expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical where it was said, "It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."' 26 If a state has a legitimate aim there seems
24. For a brief discussion of the marketability of water rights in a prior appropriation system, see Ellis, supra note 4, especially at 451-53.
25. U.S. Const. amend. V; and N.M. Const. art. II, § 20 which provides: "Private
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
26. 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). The United States Supreme Court has spoken often on
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to be little doubt that it can exercise its constitutional powers to
regulate the use of public waters, and the real question becomes
whether the owner of the water right must be compensated for the
taking.2 7 This question is especially important to this discussion because if the state is required to compensate the owner, the costs would
be prohibitive. 8
On the issue of compensation, the cases reveal a tendency to require it in those situations where the government action is direct and
aimed at a specific party or piece of property. Where, however, an
injury results indirectly from government action, the courts have
been less likely to allow compensation. 2 This ill-defined distinction
is at best a general rule for the courts, which must weigh the public
benefit achieved by the state's action against the severity of the injury."0 In applying this test to compensation for loss of a water
right, a great deal will turn on the facts in the case. Cases involving
a claim of compensation for the loss of a water right have not
reached uniform results before the United States Supreme Court."
The claim that property was denied without compensation would
probably be answered with the contention that a water right is not
property in the usual sense of the term, but is only a right to the use
of water which belongs to, and is regulated by, the state for public
benefit. An even more persuasive counter argument is that the right
claimed is not perfected because the stream has neither been adjudicated nor have priorities been enforced.
Since the question of compensation has not yet arisen as to water
rights in New Mexico it would be speculative to predict how the
state courts would hold. Suffice it to say that in passing on proposed
section two the convention should consider the possibility that the
questions of eminent domain, but a thorough review of its holdings is not necessary for
the purposes of this discussion. A recent and comprehensive study of these decisions
however, may be found in Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty
Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Supreme Ct. Rev. 63.
27. See Hines, A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Permit System-Part Two,
8 Natural Resources J. 23, 46 (1968). Professor Hines in this article deals with this constitutional issue, and although his discussion concerns Iowa's riparian water law, much
of it is applicable to the discussion of proposed section two.
28. The range of purchase prices for water rights in a prior appropriation system is
broad, and the upper limits can run into to hundreds of thousands of dollars. For example, it has been estimated that to enter the water market can require from $10,000 to
a quarter million dollars. Ellis, supra note 4, especially at 452-53.
29. Hines, supranote 27, at 46-48.
30. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
31. In United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945), government action changing the course of a stream to improve navigation and thereby denying a
water right was upheld. While in United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 4-45 (1903), compensation was awarded for the loss of property as a result of changes in a stream after
the government built a dam.
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state might have to compensate users for the loss of water rights if
strict enforcement is not adopted and the status quo preserved.
The Revision Commission suggests finally that present section
three be deleted and that a new provision be adopted. Existing section three provides:
Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right
to the use of water.
As the Commission's comment to section three points out, the
content of the present section is repetitive, regardless of whether
sections one and two are retained or proposed sections one and two
are adopted in the new constitution. 2 In the interest of avoiding
redundancy it seems desirable to omit entirely the present section
three.
The proposed section three provides:
The legislature may provide by law for the acquisition and preservation of all or specific portions of natural streams, bodies of water,
lakes or water falls in their natural conditions, in order to encourage
and protect scenic and recreational areas.
The Revision Commission's comment to section three states that
a weakness of present law is "its inability to provide water rights for
the recreational use of natural bodies of water.13 3 The Commission
then lists two reasons why this is the case: first, that there is case
authority questioning the validity of recreation as a beneficial use,
and second, that some courts have held that a diversion from a
stream is necessary to establish an appropriation of a water right.
Proposed section three has the effect of neutralizing these two unfortunate doctrines in New Mexico.
It might be argued, however, that proposed section three is unnecessary because neither of these two doctrines would be followed
in New Mexico. The Commission hints at this possibility by observing that the foundation case of the first doctrine, Lake Shore Duck
Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 4 has not been cited often by other
courts and by stating that the holding on the second doctrine is "questionable." 3 Arguing that the first doctrine should not be followed in
New Mexico, it would be urged that Lake Shore Duck Club is a legal
anachronism, not reflective of current judicial recognition of the
need for water recreation areas. To support this claim, note the New
32.
33.
34.
35.

Commission Report 186.
Id.
50 Utah 76, 166 P. 309 (1917).
Commission Report 187.
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Mexico case of State ex. rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River
Valley Co. 3 ' There it was held that beneficial use of water includes
its application for recreation and fishing. As to the second doctrine,
which requires a diversion from the stream for a valid appropriation,
it might be argued that New Mexico statutes do not require such a
diversion, and a court faced squarely with the question should not
read the requirement into the statutes.
Although a New Mexico court very likely would not follow the
two doctrines, an opposite result is not inconceivable under present
section two. Proposed section three would erase this doubt if, and
only if, the legislature acts in accordance with it to set aside specific
portions of streams or other waters in order to encourage and protect scenic and recreational areas.
It might also be said that a constitutional provision of this nature
is not necessary because the legislature now has the power to declare that recreation is a beneficial use and that a diversion from a
stream is not required.37 This contention may indeed be true, but the
adoption of proposed section three would simply make it clear that
(1) appropriations for recreational uses are sanctioned, and (2)
the legislature would make the decisions as to which waters to save
and which to leave open to full exploitation. This second accomplishment of proposed section three would seem desirable, because as the
Commission argues in its comment, decisions of this type involve
38
planning, and the legislature is best suited for this job.
There are two related questions raised by proposed section three
which should be considered by the constitutional convention. The
proposed section states that the legislature may provide for the
acquisition and preservation of water sources to encourage and protect scenic and recreational areas. But it is unclear as to who may
accomplish this acquisition or preservation. It might be desirable to
spell out in section three whether this power applies only to the state
or whether private parties may acquire and preserve water sources.
The second question raised is whether areas set aside pursuant to
proposed section three must be designated for public use or whether
such areas can be used exclusively by private parties or associations.
The convention might give some thought to a distinction in section
three which makes any acquisitions by the state open for use by the
public, while limiting state action for the benefit of private owners to
preservations of a use for recreation. In other words, the state can
36. State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., supra note 8, at 218,
182 P.2d at 428.

37. Statutes of this type are in effect in Idaho and Oregon. Idaho Code Ann. § 67-4301
(1949) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 536.300 (1963, Supp. 1965).
38. Commission Report 187.
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preserve private recreational uses but it cannot use its police powers
to acquire waters for private recreational users.
Proposed section three, like proposed section two, is an imaginative provision which has no counterpart in other western states. It is
hoped that delegates to the constitutional convention will give careful
consideration to the proposed sections and make a decision which
gives the state an article on water rights that will best meet the
needs of the future.
JOHN

M.
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